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Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America and National Automobile Dealers 
Association v. Environmental Protection Agency, 642 F.3d 192 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
Dustin Leftridge 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 The United States Chamber of Commerce (Chamber) and the National Automobile 
Dealers Association (NADA), on behalf of independent car dealerships, petitioned for review of 
an Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) decision allowing California to implement stricter 
greenhouse gas emission standards from automobiles.   In Chamber of Commerce of the United 
States of America and National Automobile Dealers Association v. Environmental Protection 
Agency,
158
 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit dismissed the 
petition for a lack of jurisdiction.  The Court of Appeals held that NADA failed to establish 
standing to challenge the EPA‘s waiver of federal preemption under the Clean Air Act (CAA) 
prior to the implementation of federal greenhouse gas emission standards.  Additionally, the 
court held the petition was moot for the years following the implementation of federal 
greenhouse gas emission standards because California‘s regulations were identical to new federal 
emission standards. 
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II.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND  
In 2004, California adopted regulations setting greenhouse gas emission standards for 
new vehicles released in model year 2009.
159
  The CAA gives the federal government exclusive 
authority to create regulations for emission standards.
160
  However, exclusion from the federal 
preemption exists for states that adopted emission standards prior to 1966.
161
  California was the 
only state to adopt emission standards prior to 1966 and therefore was the only state eligible to a 
waiver of federal preemption.
162
  In 1977, Congress amended the CAA to enable other states to 
adopt standards identical to California standards.
163
  In 2005, California asked the EPA to waive 
federal preemptions and the EPA denied the request.
164
  In January 2009, California asked the 
EPA to reconsider its previous denial.
165
  The EPA agreed to reconsider and in July 2009 issued 
an order granting the waiver.
166
  Since the EPA‘s decision, fourteen states have adopted 
California‘s greenhouse gas emission standards.167  In 2010, EPA and the National Highway 
Transportation Safety Administration (NHTSA) issued new greenhouse gas emission standards 
starting in 2012.
168
 
In an agreement between the federal government, the state of California, and major 
automobile manufactures, California modified its standards starting in 2012 to conform to the 
EPA and NHTSA national standards.
169
  The current California specific standards remain in 
place until 2012.  In return for California‘s acquiescence to federal standards, major automobile 
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manufactures and their trade associations made commitments to not oppose the 2012 national 
standards or California preemptions under the CAA.
170
  However, the Chamber and NADA did 
not join the agreement and, on behalf of their dealership members, filed a challenge to the EPA 
waiver on September 9, 2009.
171
 
VI.  ANALYSIS 
 Prior to reaching the merits of the case, the court determined that it lacked jurisdiction to 
entertain the petitioner‘s claims.172  Federal courts are without authority to render advisory 
options or to decide questions that do not affect the rights of the litigants of the case.
173
  The 
court analyzed the doctrines of standing and mootness to justify their Constitutional limitations. 
A.  The Chamber and NADA did not meet the requirements to challenge the EPA waiver 
on behalf of their membership for the years 2009 to 2012. 
 The Chamber and NADA claimed standing to sue on behalf of their members, in 
particular, the automobile dealers.  An association has standing to sue on behalf of its members 
if:  ―(1) at least one of its members would have standing to sue in his own right, (2) the interests 
the association seeks to protect are germane to its purpose, and (3) neither the claim asserted nor 
the relief requested requires that an individual member of the association participate in the 
lawsuit.‖174  To satisfy the first element, an association is required to identify individual 
members who suffered an injury.
175
  While NADA provided the declarations of two dealers 
alleging injury and the court analyzed the validity of the individual dealers standing, the court 
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concluded the Chamber did not meet the first element.
176
  The court found the last two elements 
were met by both the Chamber and NADA.
177
 
 Standing requires that:  (1) the plaintiff either has or will imminently suffer an actual, 
concrete, and particularized injury; (2) the injury have a causal and traceable connection to the 
complained of conduct; and (3) a favorable judicial decision would be likely to result in adequate 
redress.
178
  The court noted the California regulations being challenged did not regulate 
automobile dealers.
179
  The regulations affected automobile manufactures, thereby increasing the 
burden of the dealers to demonstrate injury.
180
  The dealers claimed imminent injury from 
possible price increases and possible limits on the type of cars delivered to dealerships in 
California from 2009 to 2012.
181
  The court held the mere speculation of injury was insufficient 
to establish standing.
182
  Further, the record did not contain any evidence demonstrating 
substantial probability that injuries were imminent between 2009 and 2012.
183
 
B.  The promulgation of federal regulations for the years 2012 to 2016 nullifies NADA’s 
claims of injury. 
The NADA membership dealers successfully demonstrated that between 2012 and 2016 
the California regulations would modify the type of cars produced and lead to price increases.
184
  
The court acknowledged the dealers met their burden to demonstrate an injury during the 
relevant time period.  However, beginning in 2012, automobile manufactures will be required to 
comply with the EPA and NHTSA standards.
185
  The California standards being challenged were 
identical to the 2012 national standards.  Thus, the EPA waiver for California will not be 
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responsible for any injury NADA members suffer from higher prices or a change in inventory.
186
  
The court held that even if NADA had standing when it initially sought review, the petition was 
moot because the promulgation of the 2012 national emission standards made the court unable to 
affect the rights of the parties.
187
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 The court dismissed the action brought on behalf of the plaintiffs‘ members.  The 
Chamber and NADA failed to establish sufficient standing to challenge the EPA‘s waiver of 
federal preemption for automobile emission standards.  The petitioners failed to demonstrate 
how the EPA‘s waiver had substantially injured individual members.  The petitioners also fell 
short of demonstrating how the EPA‘s waiver would cause injury to individual members above 
and beyond the federal regulations that are to take effect in 2012.  The court determined it lacked 
jurisdiction to hear a case that did not affect the rights of the petitioners and dismissed the 
petition.  The court astutely observed that if this case had been brought on behalf of the 
automobile manufacturers instead of the dealers, the case would not necessarily have been 
dismissed for standing or mootness.
188
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